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SUMMARY 
Future 1rnrld population growth is fuelled by two components: the demographic momentum, which is 
built into the age composition of current populations, and changes in reproducti1·e behaviour and mortality 
of generations yet to come. This paper irn·estigates, by major world regions and countries, what we know 
about population gro\\·th , " ·hat can be projected with reasonable certainty, and what is pure speculation. 
The exposition sets a frame for analysing demographic driving forces that are expec ted to increase human 
demand and pressures on land and water resources . These have been contrasted with current resource 
assessments of regional a,·ailability and use of land, in particular with estimates of remaining land with 
culti,·ation potential. In establishing a balance between a\'ailability of land resources and projected needs, 
the paper di stinguishes regions 11·ith limited land and water resources and high population pressure from 
areas with abundant resources and low or moderate demographic demand. Overall, it is estimated that 
two-thirds of the remaining balance of land with rainfed culti\'ation potential is currentl y co,·ered by 
,·arious forest ecosystems and wetlands. The respecti,·e percentages by region \'ary between 23 ~o in 
Southern Africa to 89 ° 0 in South-Eastern Asia. For Latin America and Asia the estimated share of the 
balance of land "·ith culti\·ation potential under forest and wetland ecosystems is about 70 percent, in 
Africa this is abou t 60 ° 0 . If these were to be presen·ed , the remaining balance of land with some potential 
for rainfed crop culti\·ation '"°uld amount to some 550 million hectares. The regions which will experience 
the largest difficulties in meeting future demand for land resources and water, or alterna ti,·ely have to 
cope with much increased dependenc,· on external supplies, include foremost \\'estern Asia, South-Central 
Asia, and :\orthern Africa. A large stress on resources is to be expected also in many countries of Eastern, 
Western and Southern Africa. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are three major institutions that publish world-
'"ide population projections: the United !\ations 
Population Di,·ision, the US Bureau of the Census and 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analy-
sis (Il..\SA). In the following analyses we "·ill only use 
the most recent edition of the U:\ Population Assess-
ments and Projections, 1\'hich was completed in 
!\O\·ember 1996. These U:\ projections ha,·e not been 
officially published at the time of writing-but we had 
access to an internal data compendium ('Annexes I 
and II ' ) that will be included in the official publication. 
The final report of the 1996 UN population projections 
will be published in late 1997. 
\\'e have, of course, also considered using the 
projections from the IIAS . .\ population program (Lutz 
1996) or those of the US Bureau of the Census (1996a). 
H owe\'er, the IIASA population scenarios are only 
arnilable for 13 \'ery large world regions, which are 
ecologica lly much too di,·e rse for stud\'ing linkages 
between population and land or water resources. The 
projec tions of the US Bureau of the Census, on the 
other hand, are a\·ailable for specific countries, but 
CO\'Cr only the period from 1950 to 2020. This time-
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frame is certainly adequate from a chemographic point 
of ,·iew, but is rather short for im·estigating resource 
constra ints. Also, the projections do not include any 
indication about the range of uncertainty, such as a 
lower and higher variant or a probability range. Only 
the U::\' population assessments and projections are 
a\·ailable for all countries worldwide, include a higher 
and lower \'arian t, and provide data series ranging 
from 1950 to 2050 which are long enough for bio-
physical research. Moreover, only the UN projections, 
which are now published every second yea r, have a 
history of more than four decades, which makes it 
possible to assess their predicti,·e accuracy. The World 
Bank, which formerly published its own projections 
(Vu 1985), has cancelled this acth·ity and uses the 
UN data. 
2. MAJOR DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
(a) World population will grow significantly in spite 
of falling fertility 
There is one most striking paradox in global 
population trends: on the one hand we have a rapid 
decline in fertility for more than two decades in many 
© 1997 The Royal Society 
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Figure 1. Total " ·orld population 1950-2050 (in billions) and a,·erage number of children per "·omen I tota l fertility 
rate: TFR ). High, medium and low \'ariant C:'\ projections 1996. (Source: C:\ Population Di,·ision. ) 
de,·eloping countries, to say nothing about the already 
extremely low fertility in most highk de\·eloped 
nations; on the other hand, "'e recently had the largest 
annual increase of \\'Orld population in history. Each 
year bet\\'een 1990 and 1995 some 85 million people 
\\'ere added to the \\'Orld 's population. \\·hy is this the 
case and "·hat are the recent estimates of fertility and 
population gro\\·th 0 
According to the most recent UN assessment, 
fertility- measured as a global ai-erage---began to 
decline in the mid-I 970s. The \\'orld 's population, 
howe,·e r, \\·i ll almost certainly continue to gro\\' for 
se\·eral decades to come (see figure 1). According to the 
UN medium variant projection we will most likely 
ha,·e a global population of about 9.4 billion by 2050. 
This is somewhat lower than the Population Di,·i sion 's 
pre,·ious estimate of 9.8 billion in the I 99.f edition of 
the World Population Estimates and Projections. 
EYen if one assumes an extremely rapid worldwide 
decline in fertility to an ayerage of 1.6 children per 
\\'Oman-which most demographers would consider 
highly unlikely- \\'e would see a further increase in the 
\\'Orld's population up to about 7.7 billion people by 
2050 (UN low fertility variant ) . Ho\\'e\'er, it is not 
impossible that the global population might increase to 
more than 1 I billion by 2050. Please note that this 
'high' UN ,·ariant still assumes a \\'orldwide fertility 
decline from currently 2.9 to about 2.6 children per 
\\'Oman (see figure I and table 1 ). 
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(b) The current annual population increase of 80 
million will probably remain constant until 2015 
Currently, the \\'orld's population is gro"·ing by 
about 80 million people per year (see figure 2 ). This is 
a little less than in the early 1990s, \\'hen the gro\\·th 
\\'as more than 85 million per year. According to the 
most recent U:\ medium ,·aria nt projection this \\'ill 
not change much during the next decades. Only after 
20 I 5 will \\·e obser\'C a gradual decline. By 2050-
according to the UN medium Yariant-this annual 
increase in the world 's population will be down to 
'only ' some 50 million. Thus, by the middle of the next 
century, world population growth (in absolute 
numbers) \\·ill ha'-e declined to the le,-el of the early 
1950s. HoweYer, this is only possible if fertility 
worldwide falls to the so-called 'reproductive level' of 
2.1 children per woman by 2050. For countries like 
India, Pakistan or :'liigeria, that is a long way to go. 
It cannot be excluded that some populous countries 
will not reach this low fertility le\·el by 2050. If, on 
average, worldwide fertility declines to only 2.6 
children per woman, world population growth would 
further increase. Between 2020 and 2050 we would have 
a global annual population increase of about 100 
million (see high variant UN projection in figure 2). 
In the near future, the current world population 
increase could only decline if worldwide average 
fertil ity falls to 1.6 (!) children per woman. There are 
not many demographers \\'ho would consider this level 
of fertility very likely . But only with such an extreme 
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Table l. Total population by region in 1950, 1995, 2025 and 2050 (in thousands): low, medium and high variant UN projections 
1996; source: U JY Population Division (1997 ) 
Ui\" projections, 1996 
histo rical estimates low variant medium variant high variant 
1950 1995 2025 
world total 2 523878 5687113 7474059 
more de-·eloped regions 812687 1171384 114998+ 
less de,·eloped regions 1 711191 4515729 6324075 
Africa 223974 719495 1370579 
Eastern Africa 65624 221315 453249 
'.\liddle Africa 26316 83271 181841 
1\orthern Africa 53302 158077 236621 
Southern Africa 15581 47335 78++9 
\\"estern Africa 63151 209498 420419 
Latin America and 166337 476637 631598 
Caribbean 
Caribbean 17039 35686 44778 
Central America 36925 123474 175438 
Sou th America 112372 317477 411382 
:\orth America 171617 2966+5 336398 
Asia 1402021 3+37787 4428376 
Eastern Asia 671156 142131+ 1572978 
South-Eastern Asia 182035 481920 63+06+ 
South-Central Asia 498583 1366866 19++ 779 
\\'estern Asia 502+7 167686 276556 
Europe 5+7318 728 2+4 669+68 
Eastern Europe 219296 310506 2719+8 
'.'\orthern Europe 7809+ 93372 89039 
Southern Europe 109012 1+3377 131939 
\\"es tern Europe 1+0916 180988 176542 
Oceania 12612 28 305 37640 
. .\ustralia / '.'\e"· Zealand 10127 21427 26380 
'.\lelanesia 2095 5814 9636 
.\Iicrones ia 153 481 811 
Polynesia 237 583 813 
least de,·eloped countries 197572 579035 1092685 
drop in fertility could " ·e obsen ·e a shrinking of the 
world's population after 20+0- assuming that there 
,_.ill be no disaster with a massi,·e increase ofmonalil\·. 
(c) Between now and 2050 world population growth 
will be generated exclusively in developing 
countries 
Between now and the year 2050, the world 's 
population " ·ill most likely increase by some 3. 7 billion 
people: almost all will be contributed by the de\'eloping 
countries (see table 2). In fact , the population of the 
de\'eloped nations as a group \\'ill most likely decline by 
almost 59 million people bet\\'een 2025 and 2050. 
Comparing the centennial gro\\'th of developed and 
den loping countries re\'eals a dramatic di,-ergence: 
the denloped countries , as a group, will have increased 
their population by less tha n 350 million bet\\·een 1950 
and 2050. The de\'eloping countries, on the other 
hand, \\'ill have added almost 6.5 billion people-thus 
almost quintupling their 1950 population. 
This modern 'population explosion ' in the Third 
Phil. Trans. R. Sor. Lo11d. B 199 i l 
2050 2025 2050 2025 2050 
7662248 8039130 9366 724 8580509 11156318 
959159 1220250 1161 741 1286 133 1351681 
6 703089 6818880 8204983 7294375 9804637 
1 731421 1453899 2046401 1546302 2408106 
593984 480182 698596 506 719 812974 
252289 187525 284821 200438 336396 
258834 256 716 317 267 276175 381781 
90256 82901 106824 87335 124900 
536058 446574 638892 475634 752055 
649866 689618 810433 752670 1000555 
45478 48211 56229 51224 65827 
189415 189143 230+25 206032 282 729 
414973 452 265 523 778 495414 651999 
301140 369016 38+054 393598 451 503 
4+05219 4 78+833 54+2567 5108307 6500750 
13 742 17 1695+69 l 722380 1 785553 1999209 
65 18+6 691911 811891 749613 99+0+6 
205795+ 210003+ 2 521 304 2256712 3053930 
321 202 297420 386992 316429 453566 
537 521 70 l 077 637 585 736585 742 331 
215673 28+ 170 255955 303 706 3110+8 
75 785 95593 9+ 194 98776 105667 
102990 137196 119887 142603 135502 
1+3072 18+ 118 167 550 191500 190115 
37081 40687 45684 43047 53073 
2+235 28809 30557 30561 35+95 
l t o+o 10150 12972 10655 15036 
928 857 1097 905 1285 
879 871 1059 926 1257 
138H l3 1159255 163 1820 1231329 1916+82 
\\"orld is of course not comparable with an,·thing we 
ha,·e experienced in the demographic transition of 
Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. It is a 
historica lly unique phenomenon. Both the absolute 
numbers of population increase and the growth rates 
are without historical precedence. No country in 
Europe has experienced annual population growth 
rates of more than 0.5- 1 % during its 'high growth ' 
period. 
(d) World population increase is concentrated in 
Asia 
From the almost 3. 7 billion people that will be 
added to the world 's population between now and 
2050, Asia will contribute two billion (see table 2). 
This enormous population increase of 2000 million 
people is due to the already massive size of the 
population. ~lost of this growth will happen in the next 
three decades . Between l 995 and 2025, Asia's popu-
lation " ·ill grow by l .35 billion. Between 2025 and 
2050, the increase will be only 658 million (see table 2). 
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Figure 2. Average annual \\"Orld population increase lin millions) and a,·erage number of children per women (total 
fertilit y rate: TFR ). High, medium and low ,·ariant C:'\ projections. (Source: C:'\ Populat ion Di, ·ision 1997. ) 
During the next three decades Africa ""ill contribute 
another 734 million people to the \\"orld 's population, 
some 15 million more than its cu rrent total population . 
Despite a projected increase in mortality due to AIDS, 
we \\"ill not observe a significan t slo\\"ing do\\"n of 
popu lation growth in Africa- to say nothing of a 
decline. Fertility is still so high in sub-Saharan Africa 
that it can offse t the effect of rising (infant and 
adult ) mortality. Latin America and the Caribbean, 
on the other ha nd, \\"ill have only a moderate 
population increase of some 213 million between 1995 
and 2025. This is due to both the smaller initial size of 
the population and the significant decline of fertility. 
Europe's popula tion will almost ce rtainly decline. The 
UN medium variant projection assumes a shrinkage of 
as much as 27 million during the nex t three decades. 
(e) By far the highest population growth rates can 
be found in Africa 
While Asia will contribute the largest number of 
people to modern world popula tion growth, Africa will 
se t the record in growth rates. In table 2 ""e have 
calculated the annual growth rates for various periods 
for all the major regions of the world (we have used 
true exponential growth rates, so that periods of 
various lengths can be compared). 
Between now and the yea r 2025, Africa's population 
is projected to have an exponential annual growth rate 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B ( 1997 ) 
of0.44 %, \\"hile the populations of Latin America and 
the Caribbean will gro\\" by 0.23 %, Asia by 0.21 % , 
and :\orthern America by 0.14 ~o · Europe's popu-
lation, most likely, will decline by 0.02 % . 
Please note that these projected growth rates for the 
next 30 years are actually lower than the historical 
growth rates during the past 45 years. Between 1950 
and 1995, exponential annual growth rates were 0.49 
(Africa), 0.44 (Latin America and the Caribbean), 
0.38 (Asia) and 0.23 (Northern America). Even Europe 
had a positive growth ra te of 0.12 (see table 2). In 
other words, in the past 45 years the population of 
Latin America grew twice as fast as it will grow in the 
next 30 years. We can also see that between 2025 and 
2050 the United Nations Population Di,·ision assumes 
much slower popula tion growth than during the next 
30 yea rs. \\'hile Africa , for instance, is projected to 
have a growth rate of 0.44 between 1995 and 2025, it 
should be only 0.26 between 2025 and 2050. 
From a methodological point of view these growth 
rates for the second quarter of the next century are, of 
course, highly uncertain. But they show the critical 
phase of world population growth to be during the 
next three decades. If the world 's population will 
increase to onl y 9.3 billion people, then most of this 
growth will happen during the next 30 years. If the 
growth rates are not down significantly by 2025, we 
will have a much larger population in 2050. 
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Table 2. Population increase (in thousands ) and in exponential annual growth rate (in %) by region during the periods 1950-1995, 
1995-2025, 2025-2050 and 1950-2050: UN medium variant projection 1996; source: UN Population Division (1997) 
world total 
more de\·eloped regions 
less de,·eloped regions 
Africa 
Eastern Africa 
Middle Africa 
:\"orrhern Africa 
Southern Africa 
\\"estern Africa 
La tin America and 
Caribbean 
Caribbean 
Central America 
South America 
:'\orth America 
Asia 
Eastern Asia 
Sou th -Eastern Asia 
South-Central Asia 
\\"estern Asia 
Europe 
Eastern Europe 
:\"onhern Europe 
Southern Europe 
\\"estern Europe 
Oceania 
Australia/ :\"ew Zea land 
~l e l anesia 
). I icronesia 
Polrnesia 
lease de\·eloped coun tries 
population change and annual exponential growth rates 
1950-1995 
in 1000s % 
3 163 235 0.34 
358697 0. 15 
2804538 0.41 
495521 0.49 
155691 0.51 
56955 0.48 
104775 0.46 
31 75f 0.47 
1+6347 0.50 
310300 0.44 
18647 0.31 
86549 0.59 
205105 O.H 
125028 0.23 
2035 766 0.38 
750158 0.31 
299885 0.41 
868 283 0.42 
117439 0.51 
180926 0. 12 
91210 0.15 
15278 0.07 
3+365 0.11 
40072 0.10 
15693 0.3+ 
11300 0.31 
3719 0.43 
328 0.48 
3+6 0.38 
381 f63 0.45 
1995-2025 
in 1000s 
2352017 
48866 
2303151 
734404 
258867 
104254 
98639 
35566 
237076 
212981 
12525 
65669 
134 788 
72371 
13470+6 
2Hl55 
209991 
733168 
129 734 
-27167 
- 26336 
2221 
- 6181 
3130 
12382 
7382 
4336 
376 
288 
580220 
% 
0.22 
0.03 
0.26 
0.44 
0.49 
0.51 
0.30 
0.35 
0.+8 
0.23 
0.19 
0.27 
0.22 
0.14 
0.21 
0.11 
0.23 
0.27 
0.36 
-0.02 
-0.06 
0.01 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.23 
0.19 
0.35 
0.36 
0.25 
O.H 
2025-2050 
in 1000s 
1327 594 
-58509 
1386103 
592502 
218414 
97296 
60551 
23923 
192318 
1208 15 
8018 
41282 
71513 
15038 
657734 
26911 
11 9980 
421270 
89572 
-63492 
- 282 15 
-1 399 
- 17309 
-16568 
4997 
17+8 
2822 
2f0 
188 
472565 
% 
0.12 
-0.04 
0.14 
0.26 
0.28 
0.32 
0.16 
0.19 
0.27 
0.12 
0.12 
0.15 
0.11 
0.03 
0.10 
0.01 
0.12 
0.14 
0.20 
- 0.07 
- 0.08 
- 0.01 
- 0.10 
- 0.07 
0.09 
O.Of 
0.19 
0.19 
0.15 
0.26 
1950-2050 
in 1000s % 
68+2846 0.25 
349054 0.07 
6493 792 0.30 
1822427 0.42 
632972 0.45 
258505 0.45 
263965 0.34 
91243 0.36 
575 74 1 0.44 
64+096 0.30 
39190 0.23 
193500 0.35 
41 1406 0.29 
212437 0.15 
40+0546 0.26 
1051224 0. 18 
629856 0.28 
2022721 0.31 
336 745 0.39 
90267 0.03 
36659 0.03 
16100 0.04 
10875 0.02 
26634 0.03 
33072 0.03 
20430 0.2 1 
10877 0.34 
94+ 0.37 
822 0.28 
143+ 2f8 0.40 
Table 3. The ten countries u·ith the highest population increases during 1950-1995, 1995-2025, 2025-2050 and 1950-2050: UN 
medium variant projection 1996; source: UX Population Di1•ision (1997) 
(The dashes indicate countries which " ·ere not among the ten with highest population gro"·th in a particular period. ) 
country 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
CSA 
Brazil 
Pakistan 
::\igeria 
Bangladesh 
~l ex ico 
Iran (Islamic Republic ol) 
Ethiopia 
Zaire 
past population 
increase 1950- 1995 
(in 1000s) 
66546+ 
5714H 
117922 
109302 
1050+0 
96744 
78786 
76446 
63408 
51452 
Phil. Trnns. R. Soc. Lond. B ( 1997) 
projected population 
increase 1995- 2025 
(in 1000s) 
260206 
401196 
77785 
65366 
132647 
126676 
61 751 
59886 
7988+ 
60472 
projected population 
increase 2025- 2050 
(in 1000s) 
40372 
173982 
36802 
23143 
72642 
80945 
32585 
34993 
62534 
47987 
centennial population 
increase 1950-2050 
(in 1000s) 
961904 
l 175 11 3 
238 726 
189730 
189284 
317840 
305575 
176405 
153356 
194298 
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Figure 3. China and India: total population 19j0- 20j0 (in billions ). Low, medium and high ,·ariant C:'\ projections 
1996. (Source : C:'\ Population Di,·ision 1997.) 
(f) Ten countries will contribute most to world 
population growth during the next 30 years 
The ten countries "·hich \\·ill contribute most to 
world population growth O\·er the next 30 years are 
India, China, Pakistan, >:igeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
the United States of America , Bangladesh, Zaire and 
Iran- in that order 1 
According to the most recent U:'\ population 
projection, India will add more than 400 million to its 
population ben,·een 1995 and 2025. China will grow 
b\" only 260 million (see table 3). The next largest 
contributor to world population growth, surprisingly, 
is not Indonesia, \\·hich has the third largest population 
among de,·eloping countries, but Pakistan. Pakistan 
"·ill grow by about 133 million bet\\·een 1995 and 2025. 
An almost equal contribution to world population 
grO\\"th will probably come from Nigeria- 127 million . 
Perhaps unexpected, the next largest contributor to 
world population growth will be Ethiopia, which will 
add another 80 million people. Indonesia, on the other 
hand, will grow by 'only' 78 million-which is only 
ranked six in the 'hit list' of contributors to world 
population growth. The United States will probably 
grow by 65 million and Bangladesh by 62 million. Few 
development experts would ha\·e put Zaire on a watch 
list for population problems. But the population in this 
Central African country is projected to grow by more 
than 60 million. The tenth largest contributor to world 
population growth will be Iran- with a population 
increase of almost 60 million between 1995 and 2025 
(see table 3). 
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(g) India will out-grow China 
India has one of the oldest family planning pro-
grammes. It started way back in the 1950s. The 
country's a\·erage fertility , howeYer, declined onlv 
sJo,dy. In the early 1950s, both China and India had 
a total fertility rate (TFR) of about six children per 
woman . But while China's TFR sharply fell to about 
2.4 in 1990, it declined only slowly in India and was 
still above four children per woman in 1990. This 
relatively slow decline of fertility has built up a huge 
population momentum in India. The country's popu-
lation structure is much 'younger ' than that of China. 
These young adults-born during the high growth 
period in the 1950s, 1960s and eyen l 970s-will have 
children in the near future. E,·en if fertility continues to 
decline to reproductive le\·el by 2020 (as being assumed 
by the UN projections), the Indian population will 
probably increase to almost 1.6 billion by 2050, slightly 
more than that of China (UN medium variant) (see 
figure 3). Howe\·er, India's population might become 
even larger. If the average TFR would only decline to 
2.6 (instead of 2.1 ) children per woman in 2020, the 
population would increase to about 1.9 billion (!) by 
2050 (see high UN variant in figure 3). 
(h) Nigeria and Pakistan: emerging population 
giants 
There are not many countries in the world where 
population projections are more difficult to believe 
than in Nigeria. If the latest UN projections are 
400 
350 
" ~ 300 
E 
e. 250 
c: 
.Si 
-;; 
::; 200 
0. 
rf. 
-;; 150 ;s 
100 
(a) 
c:::::JTot<1IPopulahon(H1gh) 
=:i Total Population (Med1um) 
c::::::JTotal PopulatJon(lOWJ 
-O-- Ch1h11en perWomen (High) 
-=-Ch•ldren per Women (LOW) 
450 ~--------------~ (c) 
400 
7.0 
~ 6.0 t. 
c: 
" E
5.0 ~ 
.... 
0 
3.0 _g 
E 
" z 
2.0 ~ 
:; 
7.0 
" > 
...; 
2 
Population momentum G. Fischer and G. K. Heilig 875 
450 ~--------------~7.5 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
(b) 
c::::JTotalPopula!IOn(H1gh) 
c=i Total Popul<1llan (Medium) 
c:::::::J TotalPopu1111on(LOW? 
-<>-Children per Women (High) 
....... Ch11dren1Women (Med1umJ 
-=-Cr11ldren per Women (LOW) 
7.0 
6.5 
6.0 ~ 
5.5 e 
E 
5.0 ~ 
4.5 ~ 
~ 
4.0 :!2 
:.c: 
3.5 u 
'o 3.0 ~ ~ 2.5 
" z
2.0 ~ 
l"l-!--1+>11 1.5 ~ 
1.0 ~ 
0.5 
o ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o.o 
450 ~--------------~ 7.5 (d) 
7.0 
400 6.5 
350 
c:::::::JTota1Pooula!lOn(H1ghJ 
c:z:JTota1Popul<1l!On(Med1um) 
c:::::JTotal Pop•Jlat1on{Low) 
-O- Ch1telren per Women (High) 
....... r.h1ld1enperWomen(Med•um) 
-:-Ch1ld1en per Women (LOW) 
6
·
0 ~ 350 
c:::::J TotalPoputa11on(H1gnJ 
i==i Total Pooutanon (Medium) 
c:::::::JT 01a1Pooutat1on (low) 
-o- Children per Women (High) 
2 
6.0 ~ 
" ~ 300 
E 
e. 250 
c: 
.Si 
:g 200 
0. 
rf. 
3 150 
~ 
100 
50 
0 0 
'D r-
"" "" 
0 0 
00 "" 
"" "" 
§ 
N 
0 
0 
N 
0 
N 
0 
N 
0 0 
8 3 
N N 
" 
" E
5.0 ~ 
c: 
2 
4.0 31 
:.c: 
u 
'o 
3.0 t; 
.D § 
z 
2.0 g, 
e 
" 
1.0 ~ 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
--Children cerwamen (Med) 
~ChtldrencerWamen (LowJ 
5.5 13 
E 
5.0 ~ 
4.5 c: 
~ 
4.0 3 
:.c: 
3.5 ~ 
0 
3.0 t; 
.D 
2.5 § 
z 
2.0 ~ 
e '-~-..,,,..--_,,.'°"'"I 1.5 " 
< 1.0 
0.5 
0 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0.0 
0 
v; 
"" 
0 0 
00 "" 
"" "" 
0 
0 
N 
0 0 
8 3 
N N 
0 
v; 
0 
N 
Figure 4. Total popul at ions 1950-2050 (in millions ) and a,·erage number of children per woman ( total fertility rate: 
TFR) in (a) !\igeria, (b) Pakista n, (c) Ba ngladesh and (d) Thailand. (All charts are to the same scales. Source: UN 
Population Division 1997. ) 
correct, then our children (and the younger among us ) 
will watch the emergence of an African population 
giant, comparable to the most populous Asian nations. 
In 1950, the West African countries had a population 
of about 33 million ; since then, the population has 
more than tripled. The UN Population Division 
estimates that Nigeria's population in 1995 was about 
112 million (note that the UN does not revise their 
estimate according to the most recent Nigerian census, 
which was significantly lower. Obviously, the UN 
Population Division do not consider this census 
accurate enough). Between now and the year 2050, the 
country's population will probably triple again and 
reach almost 339 million (see figure 4). If that really 
Phil. Tmns. R. Soc. lond. B (1997) 
happens, we will have a ten-fold increase of a 33 million 
population within one century. This would have no 
historical precedence. Note that we are talking about 
the medium variant UN projection. Based on the demo-
graphic parameters it would be not impossible if 
Nigeria's population would grow even faster. 
There are other overwhelmingly Muslim popu-
lations with very high population growth rates, such as 
those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the United Arab 
Emirates. But none of them is projected to have such a 
massive absolute increase in population as Pakistan. In 
1950, Pakistan had a population of about 40 million 
people , and was quite comparable in population size to 
Bangladesh (42 million), Brazil (54 million) or Italy 
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Table 4. Total population (in thousands ) and proportion of global population by region (in %) , 1950, 1995, 2025 and 2050: 
US medium rariant projection 1996; source : UN Population Division (1997) 
total pop ulation (in 1000s) 
1950 1995 
world total 2 523878 5687113 
more de\-eloped regions 812687 1171384 
less developed regions I 711191 4515729 
Africa 223974 719495 
Eastern Africa 65624 221315 
!\liddle Africa 26316 83271 
:'\orthern Africa 53302 158077 
Southern Africa 15581 47335 
\\'es tern Africa 63151 209498 
Latin America and 166337 476637 
Caribbean 
Caribbean 17039 35686 
Central America 36925 123474 
South America 112372 317477 
r\ort h America 171617 296645 
Asia 1402021 343 7787 
Eastern Asia 671156 1421314 
South-Eastern Asia 182035 481920 
South-Central Asia 498583 1366866 
\ \ ' esrern Asia 50247 167 686 
Europe 547318 728244 
Eastern Europe 219296 3 10506 
:'\onhern Europe 78094 93372 
Southern Europe 109 012 143377 
\\'estern Europe 140 916 180988 
Oceania 12612 28305 
.-\ustrali a/:'\ew Zealand 10127 21427 
l\!elanesia 2095 5814 
~lic rones ia 153 481 
Polynesia 237 583 
least de,·eloped countries 197 572 579035 
(39 million). Since then Pakista n's population has 
more than tripled , and stood at 136 million in 1995. At 
that time the populations of Brazil, Bangladesh and 
Italy were 159, 118, and 57 million , respec tively. But 
the real population explosion in Pakistan will come 
during the next few decades. The population not only 
has a very large proportion of young men and women 
of reproductive age , but also still extremely high 
fertility- much higher, for instance , than m 
Bangladesh or Brazil. These young couples will 
produce a large number of children even if we assume, 
as in the UN medium variant , a decline of average 
fertility to reproductive level (of 2.1 children per 
woman) by 2020. Pakistan's population will be about 
357 million by 2050 (according to the UN medium 
,·ariant projection)- far larger than that of Bangladesh 
(218 million), Brazil (243 million) or Italy (42 million) 
(see figure 4). However, it is (demographically) not 
impossible that Pakistan 's population will increase 
even further to some 413 million by 2050 (UN high 
variant projection). 
High fertility in the early 1950 was not the only 
reason for the exceptional population growths of 
Nigeria and Pakistan. There were other countri es 
which had a similar or even higher level of fertility . 
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percentage of world population 
2025 2050 1950 1995 2025 2050 
8039130 9366 724 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1220250 1161741 32.2 20.6 15.2 12.4 
6818880 8204983 67.8 79.4 84.8 87.6 
1453899 2046401 8.9 12. 7 18. l 21.8 
480182 698596 2.6 3.9 6.0 7.5 
187 525 284821 1.0 1.5 2.3 3.0 
256 716 317267 2. 1 2.8 3.2 3.4 
8290 1 106824 0.6 0.8 1.0 I. I 
446574 638892 2.5 3.7 5.6 6.8 
689618 810433 6.6 8.4 8.6 8.7 
4821 1 56229 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
189143 230425 1.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 
452265 523 778 4.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 
369016 384054 6.8 5.2 4.6 4.1 
4 784833 5442567 55.6 60.4 59.5 58. l 
1695469 1 722380 26.6 25.0 21. 1 18.4 
69 19 11 81 1891 7.2 8.5 8.6 8.7 
2100034 2521304 19.8 24.0 26.1 26.9 
297420 386992 2.0 2.9 3.7 4.1 
701077 637 585 21.7 12.8 8.7 6.8 
284170 255955 8.7 5.5 3.5 2.7 
95593 94194 3.1 1.6 1.2 1.0 
137 196 119887 4.3 2.5 1.7 1.3 
184118 167550 5.6 3.2 2.3 1.8 
40687 45684 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
28809 3055 7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
10150 12 972 0. 1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
857 1097 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
871 1059 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 159255 1631820 7.8 10.2 14.4 17.4 
Consider the case of Bangladesh and Thailand . The 
TFR in Bangladesh during the early 1970s was as high 
as that of Nige ria or Pakistan, and the initial 
population size was quite comparable. Yet Bangladesh 
is projected to have a population of' only' 220 million 
by 2050 (as compared to Nigeria's 339 million). 
Thailand is one of the Asian ' success stories' in 
population control : its average TFR was as high as in 
Nigeria but has declined sharply since the 1970s. As a 
result Thailand will have a very moderate population 
increase between now and 2050 of only some 14. 7 
million (see figure 4). 
(i) The global balance of the world's population has 
shifted significantly betw een 1950 and 1995. It will 
change even more dramatically between now and 
2050 
Europe's share of the world 's population has declined 
sharply from 21. 7 % in 1950 to 12.8 % in 1995. Africa's 
share, on the other hand , has increased from 8.9 to 
12.7 % (see table 4). Today, both Europe and Africa 
are each home to about one-eighth of the world's 
population. This will change significantly in the future. 
Europe's share of the global population will shrink to 
about 6.8 % in 2050. Africa's share will grow to 21.8 %-
Hence, one century of population growth will com-
pletely renrse Europe's and Africa's position: Europe's 
share of the global population in 2050 will be the 
same as that of Africa in 1950. If the UN medium 
,·ariant projections turn out to be correct (and there 
is no sign that they may be utterly wrong) we have 
to expect a dramatic change in the global balance 
of the population: a much bigger share of the world 
population will li,·e in Africa , south of the Sahara. In 
only some 50 years, \\'estern Africa, for instance, will 
have the same population as all of Europe and Eastern 
Africa will have much more people than all the 
countries of South America, the Caribbean and 
Oceania combined. 
(j) Worldwide, the population will age 
During the next decades the world population 
structure will ineYitably age. This is an unaYoidable 
consequence of large birth cohorts during the 1950s 
and 1960s and the rapid fertility decline since the 
1970s. In 2025 the ' baby boomers' of the 1950s and 
1960s will be between 65 and 75 years of age. These 
large aging cohorts are followed by the relatiYely small 
' bab,· bust' generations of the worldwide fertility 
decline. 
In 1950, there were only 131 million people of age 65 
and older ; in 1995 the number of elderly had 
tripled- it ,,·as estimated at 371 million. Between now 
and the ,·ear 2025 it will more than double again , and 
by 2050 we might have more than l.4 billion elderly 
worldwide (see table 5). In 1950, only 5.2 ~ 0 of the 
" ·orld"s population were aged 65 or more; today the 
percentage has already increased to 6.2 ~~'and by 2025 
one out of ten people worldwide will be 65 years of age 
or more. 
While currently population aging is most serious in 
Europe and Japan, Eastern Asia (China) will ex-
perience a dra m a tic increase in the proportion of 
elderly people by the middle of the next century. This 
is largely due to the country's success in family 
planning, "·hich rapidly reduced the relative size of 
birth cohorts since the 1970s. 
2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC MOMENTUM 
As we ha,·e demonstrated with the projections above 
there is almost no doubt that the world population will 
grow for quite some time. Of course we can imagine 
massi,·e natural catastrophes, such as the world being 
hit by a huge meteor; we can also think about the 
emergence of a highly contagious lethal virus for which 
no cure or immunization can be found; or we could be 
frightened about a worldwide nuclear war that might 
result in sudden, non-re,·ersible climate change-but 
short of these highly unlikely e,·ents , almost nothing 
could stop the global population from increasing by 
another few billion people. \\"hy are we so sure about 
this? 
First, there is a driving force concealed in the 
'young' age structure of the world's population that 
just cannot be switched off. Due to high fertility in the 
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1950s, 1960s and early 1970s in many developing 
countries, large numbers of women (and men) are 
currently entering reproductive age. The world is full 
of young adults that will have children. Even if each 
couple has a smaller number of children than their 
parents, the total number of offspring will be sub-
stantial. This 'echo effect' of a high-fertility period in 
the past creates a 'demographic momentum' which 
works against changes in reproductive behaviour that 
favour smaller families. Second, it is highly unlikely 
that large populations will instantly change their repro-
ductive behaviour. Certain sections of a population, 
such as highly educated middle-class couples in urban 
areas, might adopt radical behavioural change almost 
overnight, but many developing countries still have 
large rural populations where fertility is linked to deep-
rooted cultural values or social conditions, and can 
decline only gradually over two or three generations. 
\\'e must also take into account that the average 
fertility of a population is a composite measure which 
results from the reproductive behaviour of several 
parent cohorts: these include couples which already 
ha\'e a certain number of children and can only reduce 
the number of additional offspring. Even in a country 
like China, where we ha\'e a highly controlled society 
and a most rigorous family planning programme, it 
took 20 years to reduce average fertility from about 6 to 
2.4 children. In India, according to UN projections, 
this process might take 60 years or more. 
These t\\·o basic facts , which are well known among 
demographers, tend to slow down demographic 
change. They can produce a considerable time-lag 
between the first signs of a fertility decline and a slow 
down in population growth. In fact, it is quite typical 
for developing countries that the total number of births 
increases for one or e,·en two decades, while the fertility 
(that is the a\·erage number of children per woman) 
al read,. declines. Consider figure 2 in which we ha\'e 
plotted global population growth together with the 
change in TFR as being deri\'ed from the l 996 round 
of UN population assessments and projections. Note 
that between l 950 and 1995, the chart is based on 
(estimates of) historical data , while from l 995 to 2050, 
both the total population and the TFR are projected. 
Globallv , the TFR dropped from about five children 
per woman in l 950 to some 2.9 in 1995; during that 
same period, the world's population more than doubled 
from 2.5 to 5.2 billion. The UN assumes a further steep 
decline in fertility to 2. l children in 2050. During that 
period the world population will further increase to 9.3 
billion people. 
Between l 965 and 1995, while the TFR dropped 
significantly, the annual increase in the world's 
population grew from about 65 to 85 million. In other 
words, more and more people were added to the global 
population, while couples had less and less children 
(see figure 2). 
These contrary trends become even more apparent 
when we plot indices of the TFR, the average annual 
increase in the population and the annual population 
growth rates. For the five-year period of 1950-1955, 
the indices are set to l 00 (see figure 2). This 'paradox' 
is simply a consequence of the fact that the increase in 
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the number of parents outpaced the decline in fertility. 
In fact, this situation will continue for some time. 
According to the most recent UN projections we will 
have a stable annual increase of about 80 million 
people until 2015-only then will this increase gradu-
ally decline to about 47 million in 2050. By the middle 
of the next century the world's population will still 
grow by about the same number of people as there 
were in 1950-only the total number of people on the 
planet will be more than three times larger. 
3. WHAT DO WE NOT KNOW ABOUT 
FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH? 
\\'e know that fertility is declining almost eYery-
"·here. But we do not know how fast and to \\·hat leHl 
it "·ill fall. There is not much indication that some 
Islamic countries, such as Pakistan or the Gulf states in 
\\"este rn Asia, will ha,·e significantly lm\"er fertility in 
the near future . On the other hand there are signs that 
fertility is dropping even faster than expected in several 
other Asian and even African countries. This would 
result in a smaller world population than previously 
expected. Some researchers e\·en belieYe that the global 
population could stabilize somewhat below 10 billion 
people in the long run (Lutz 1996 ). Of course, this is to 
a large extent based on educated speculation, since it 
depends on assumptions about changes in reproductive 
behaviour of people who are not even born today. 
There is great controversy among demographers as to 
whether these assumptions can be justified: some 
highly respected demographers, such as Nathan 
Keyfitz or Joel E. Cohen, have argued that population 
projections are impossible beyond 10 or 15 years 
(Keyfitz 1981 ; Cohen, 1995) . Others have applied 
sophisticated methodologies, such as probabilistic 
projections, to calculate even very long-term pro-
jections (or scenarios ) up to the year 2100 (Lutz 1996). 
Those who haYe regularly conducted world population 
projections for more than three decades, such as the 
Ul\ Population Division , can argue that their pro-
jections were fairly accurate if compared with the 
actual de,·elopment (see Heilig 1996). 
The debate is still undecided . The only thing we 
know for sure is that there is a high degree of uncertainty 
for any projection that expands over more than two or 
three decades. One reason for this uncertainty is the 
high sensitivity of long-term projections to different 
Table 5. Total number (in thousands ) and proportion of elderly (in %) of total population by region in 1950, 1995, 2025 and 
2050: U.V medium i·ariant projection 1996; source: US Population Dfrision (1997) 
population age 65 + 
population age 65 + (in 1000s) as ~ 0 of tota l population 
1950 1995 2025 2050 1950 1995 2025 2050 
" ·orld total 130669 370 707 801929 141592+ 5.2 6.5 10.0 15.1 
more de,·eloped regions 64052 157950 246503 287373 7.9 13.5 20.2 24.7 
less de,·eloped regions 66617 212757 555427 I 128551 3.9 4.7 8.1 13.8 
Africa 7058 22 702 61211 161408 3.2 3.2 4.2 7.9 
Eastern Africa 1915 6121 15601 46282 2.9 2.8 3.2 6.6 
:\liddle Africa 999 2606 6236 I 7220 3.8 3.1 3.3 6.0 
:\orthern Africa 1844 6104 17749 42302 3.5 3.9 6.9 13.3 
Southern Africa 565 2014 5299 12112 3.6 4.3 6.4 11.3 
\\"estern Africa 1736 5856 16326 43491 2. 7 2.8 3. 7 6.8 
Latin America and 6220 24171 66425 135362 3.7 5.1 9.6 16.7 
Caribbean 
Caribbean 760 2376 5214 9233 4.5 6. 7 10.8 16.4 
Central America 1498 5123 15815 36968 4.1 4.1 8.4 16.0 
Sou th America 3963 16671 45395 89161 3.5 5.3 10.0 17.0 
'.\orth America 14102 37080 68367 82550 8.2 12 .5 18.5 21.5 
Asia 57384 183427 458581 863449 4.1 5.3 9.6 15.9 
Eastern Asia 29978 96559 225266 345838 4.5 6.8 13.3 20.1 
South-Eastern Asia 6774 20712 56393 124 734 3.7 4.3 8.2 15.4 
South-Central Asia 18428 58 757 15569+ 345205 3.7 4.3 7.4 13.7 
\\'estern Asia 2204 7399 21229 47671 4.4 4.4 7.1 12.3 
Europe 44981 100620 141764 164 798 8.2 13.8 20.2 25.8 
Eastern Europe 14287 38201 50967 59786 6.5 12.3 17.9 23.4 
'.\orthern Europe 8045 14343 19323 21645 10.3 15.4 20.2 23.0 
Southern Europe 8303 20913 30810 37085 7.6 14.6 22.5 30.9 
\\"estern Europe 14347 27163 40665 46282 10.2 15.0 22.1 27.6 
Oceania 930 2724 5601 8384 7.4 9.6 13.8 18.4 
Australia/New Zealand 839 2504 4948 6717 8.3 11.7 17.2 22.0 
1\!elanesia 82 182 532 1375 3.9 3.1 5.2 10.6 
~Iicronesia 3 15 52 126 2.0 3.1 6.1 11.5 
Polynesia 6 24 70 165 2.5 4.1 8.0 15.6 
least dewloped countries 6521 17658 45543 124915 3.3 3.0 3.9 7.7 
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assumptions on the timing of the fertility decline. Even 
if all demographers would agree that fertility will come 
down to 2.1 children per woman in 2050 (which is the 
current UN assumption) a few years delay in this 
decline can make a difference for a world population 
of a few billion people. 
So far we have only talked about fertility. Of course 
this is a crude simplification. The real trouble begins 
when we take into account future changes in mortality. 
It was con\'entional wisdom among demographers for 
quite some time that mortality is not a very important 
issue when it comes to population projections: the 
de\'eloping countries would simply follow the trends in 
the developed world which were thought to have 
already stabilized. The lowest lenl of infant mortality 
would be around ten deaths per IOOO life births, and 
the maximum life expectancy would be about 82.5 years 
for men and 87.5 years for women (this was the UN 
assumption since their 1988 round of projections). 
Howe,·er, things han changed unexpectedly. First, 
there is an ongoing decline in mortality in many 
denloped countries. In particular, adult and old-age 
mortality is falling quite significantly for both men and 
women. Al'erage life expectancy in some of these 
populations (such as in Austria) has increased by about 
two years per decade during the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. A growing number of people are approaching 
ages that were pre,·iously considered a biological upper 
limit of the human life span. :\licrobiological and 
genetic research has made a big step forward to 
understand (and possibly manipulate ) the process of 
aging. It is not impossible that human life can be 
significantly expanded in the future by a combination 
of dietary practices, specific drugs and genetic therapy. 
Second, the expected across-the-board decline of 
mortality in the de,·eloping \\·orld has not materialized. 
\\'hile some de,·eloping countries, such as China, ha,·e 
seen a spectacular increase in life expectancy, others 
ha,·e lagged behind or, in fact, ha,·e enn experienced 
recent declines. Pre,·ious ass umptions might ha,·e been 
overoptimistic, especialh· for sub-Saharan Africa, gi,·en 
the high pre\·alence ofH l\'-infection and AIDS, newly 
spreading tropical diseases and " ·idespread ,·iolent 
conflicts. 
Both trends ha,·e added uncertainty to our population 
projections, or rather made us aware of the uncertainty 
that was already there. \\'hile the prospects for 
increasing longe\'ity among highly developed popu-
lations might only amplify their structural problems of 
aging , it is the new threat from AIDS and other causes 
in developing countries which could have a significant 
impact on world population growth. So far this is not 
in sight, but no one knows the future of the AIDS 
epidemic in India or other populous Asian countries. 
There is indication, for instance, that HIV infection is 
spreading rapidly in India and Thailand (US Bureau 
of the Census 1996 b). 
The best strategy for reducing this uncertainty in 
population projections is to regularly revise the 
estimates, based on the most recent demographic 
evidence. The UN Population Division has an excellent 
record for continuously fine-adjusting of their esti-
mates. Also, their early estimates from the 1960s seem 
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to have been remarkably accurate for the year 2000 
(see Heilig 1996). 
4. ES TIM A TING THE BALANCE OF 
REMAINING LAND WITH CULTIVATION 
POTENTIAL 
In this section we discuss to what extent the 
availability of land resources in the less developed 
countries can be expected to support the unpre-
cedented population growth that will occur over the 
next 2-3 decades in many regions. The aim is to 
estimate the amount ofland that from climatic, edaphic 
and topographic conditions may be adjudged the 
capability to sustain food crop production. Further-
more, we are interested in the relative quality of these 
lands, their broad geographic distribution as well as the 
major type of ecosystems that presently cover these 
areas. 
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO ), together with IIASA, has developed and 
widely applied a methodological framework for assess-
ments of land producti\'ity which originally was 
designed for use in agricultural development planning 
and natural resources management (F AO 1978-8 l ; 
FAO/ llASA 1993; Fischer & van Velthuizen 1996). A 
first assessment comparing crop production potential 
to minimum food requirements concluded that, overall, 
less de,·eloped regions would be able to feed their 
growing populations (FAO/llASA/UNFPA 1982). 
Agroecological zoning (AEZ) involves the inventory, 
characterization, and classification of the land 
resources in a way that is meaningful for assessments of 
the potential of agricultural production systems. This 
characterization of land resources includes components 
of climate, soi ls and landform , basic for the supply of 
water, energy, nutrients and physical support to plants. 
Crops require heat, light, and water in varying 
amounts. The geographic distribution of crops is 
mainly gm·erned by these climatic elements. Tem-
perature, water, and solar radiation are key climatic 
parameters which condition the net photosynthesis and 
allow crops to accumulate dry matter according to the 
rates and patterns which are specific to individual crop 
species. Crops ha,·e specific temperature requirements 
for their growth and development, and prevailing 
temperatures set the limits of crop performance when 
moisture (and radiation) requirements are met. Simi-
larly, when temperature requirements are met, the 
growth of a crop is largely dependent on how well the 
length of its growth cycle matches the period when 
water is available. In the AEZ approach, this has led to 
the concept of the length of growing period (LGP) 
which is defined as the period (in days) during the year 
in which water a\·ailability and prevailing temperature 
can sustain crop growth. 
Crop performance depends as well on the availability 
of nutrients in the soil, its capacity to store water and 
to provide mechanical support for crops. Therefore, 
agroecological zoning also includes an inventory of 
relevant soil and landform characteristics. The specific 
combinations of climatic, soil and terrain inventories 
form the basic land resources units of analysis. 
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Technical specifications (including management) 
within a socio-economic setting under which a specific 
crop is grown ha,·e been defined as land utilization 
types (LUT). Crop suitability assessments, in essence, 
are based on matching of crop specific adaptability 
characteristics and LUT ecological requirements with 
the attributes of indi,·idual land units. 
(a) Estimating the extent of land with crop 
production potential 
To estimate the scope for expanding agriculture in 
response to population growth in developing countries, 
and to assess the possible impact on forest ecosystems of 
increasing the extents of cultivated land, a rather 
detailed assessment of land resources and land with 
rainfed cultivation potential was carried out at IIASA 
to pro,·ide inputs to an FAO study (FAO 1995). Some 
of the calculation steps were recently repeated using 
additional data and procedures, invoh·ing fi,·e main 
steps: (i) quantifying land with cultivation potential; 
(ii ) delineation of protected areas; (iii ) subtracting 
land for habitation and infrastructure; (i,·) o\·erlaying 
of global ecosystems database; and (v) subtraction of 
land currently in cultivation. 
The input for the e\·aluation of land with rainfed 
crop production potential consists of se,·e ral geo-
referenced data sets: (i) the in\'entory of soil and land 
form characteristics from the FAO- U:\ESCO Soil 
:\lap of the \\'orld (S:\!\\') (FAO 1991 ) ; and (ii ) the 
im·entory of climate regimes in which data on 
temperature, rainfall, relati\'e humidity, wind speed 
and global radiation are used together with infor-
mation on e,·apotranspiration to characterize the 
thermal regimes and length of growing periods. The 
digitized inventories \\·ere overlaid to create a land 
resources im·entory composed of se\'e ral hundred 
thousa nds of land units, i.e. pieces of land of ,·arying 
size with unique soil, land form and climate attributes. 
Each land unit was tested for its suitability to grow 
any of the selected 21 major agricultural crops, under 
three 1e,·els of technologv. (The crops are: millet, 
sorghum, maize, spring wheat, winter wheat, barley, 
bunded rice, upland rice , sweet potato, cassava, white 
potato, phaseolus bean, groundnut, soybean , cowpea, 
chickpea, oil palm, sugarcane, banana, oli,·e and 
cotton.) 
The estimated yields for each land unit, crop and 
technology alternative were then compared with those 
obtainable in the same major climate zone but without 
soi l and terrain constraints, the latter yields being 
termed the maximum constraint-free yield. Any piece 
of land so tested, or part thereof, is classified as 
suitable for rainfed crop production ifat least one of the 
crops could be grown under any one of the three 
technology alternatives, with a yield of20 % or more of 
the maximum constraint-free yield for that man-
agement level. If more than one crop met this criterion, 
the amount of land classified as suitable was de-
termined on the basis of the crop which could use the 
largest part of the land unit. Land units where none of 
the 21 crops met this criterion were classified as not 
sui table (NS) for rainfed crop production. 
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The land assessed as having potential for rainfed 
crop production is further classified into three broad 
suitability classes. \·\'hen simulated crop yields were 
within 80-100 % of maximum constraint-free yield, the 
land was classified as very suitable (VS), suitable (S) 
when within 40- 80 %, and marginally suitable (MS) 
when assessed yield levels were 20-40 %. In presenting 
the results we consider fiw aggregate land classes, 
based on the combination of moisture conditions and 
crop suitability, as used by the FAO (FAO 1988, 
1995) : ( 1) Low rainfall class (LOW) : dry semi-arid 
areas with length of growing periods of 75-120 days, all 
suitable soils. (2) Uncertain rainfall class (UNC) : 
moist semi-arid areas with LGP of 120-180 days and 
,·ery suitable (VS) or suitable (S) land. (3) Good 
rainfall class (GOOD) : subhumid areas with LGP of 
180-270 days and very suitable (VS) or suitable (S) 
land. (4) Problem area class (PROB ) : includes VS, S 
and :\IS land in humid and per-humid regions (with 
LGP greater than 270 days), and moderately suitable 
(:\IS) land in LGPs of 120-270 days. (5) Naturally 
flooded class (NFL): includes all suitable land where 
soils are classified as Fluvisols or Gleysols. 
(b) Delineation of protected areas 
\\'hen land is indicated as legally-defined protected 
(national parks, conservation forest and wildlife 
resen ·es) the respecti\'e land units are e,·aluated for 
cultivation potential but not considered a,·ailable for 
agricultural expansion. In the >tudy, the rele,·ant data 
were available for 63 of the developing countries. :\laps 
and im·entories of national parks, consef\'ation forest 
and "·ildlife reserves (IUCN 1990) \\ere made a\·ail-
able by the \\'orld Consen·ation and :\lonitoring 
Centre (Cambridge, UK ) and pro,·ided to IIASA by 
the FAO. The data on protected areas are geo-
referenced and thus could be o,·erlaved on the land 
resources in\'entory. These areas delineated in the GIS 
occupv a total of almost 400 million ha, i.e. about 6° 0 
of the total land area in de\'eloping countries (ex-
cluding China). Of this, around 200 million ha were 
assessed as ha,·ing some potential for crop culti\·ation, 
representing about 8 % of the total extent with crop 
culti\'ation potential. 
(c) Subtraction of land for habitation and 
infrastructure 
\\'e have also attempted to broadly estimate the 
amount of land currently used for habitation and 
infrastructure occupying areas assessed as having 
cultivation potential. Detailed information to estimate 
region-specific land use for these purposes is scarce. 
The functional relationship parameterized in the study 
relies mainly on county-level data from China. It 
expresses per capita use of land for habitation and 
infrastructure in relation to population density. 
Examples of the parameterization are as follows: at 35 
persons per km' the simulated requirement is 50 ha per 
1000 people (i.e. l.75 % of the land); at 150 persons 
per km2 , the use is 26 ha per 1000 people (i.e. 3.9 % of 
the land ), at 675 persons per km2 the use is 20 ha per 
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Table 6. Balance of land with rainfed crop production potential in less developed regions: authors' calculation based on FAO 
(1995) 
total with 
low rainfall uncertain good rainfall gleysols and rainfed 
area rainfall area area 
(LOW) (UNC) (GOOD) 
1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha 
gross 161997 361849 645013 
protected 7526 19204 44691 
habitation 90 4038 10801 15275 
net 150433 331844 585046 
cultivated 87565 154 757 267084 
balance 62868 177087 317 962 
010 forest and 34 45 58 
wetland 
forest and wetland 21493 79311 185409 
other 41375 97775 132 553 
1000 persons (some 13.5 ~ o of the land ), etc. Based on 
a georeferenced data set of population density, the 
respective subtraction of land for habitation and infra-
structure purposes is carried out in each land unit. 
(d ) Overlaying of the global ecosystems database on 
the land with cultivation potential 
To estimate the dist ribution of ecosystems among 
land assessed as ha\'ing rainfed crop production 
potential a global ecos\'stems digital database 
(Kineman & Ohrenschall 1992). was o,·erlayed with 
the land resources data. The data se t is coded on a 10' 
by IO' lati tude/ longitude raster of grid-cells, providing 
an adequate resolution for regional studies. Sixty 
ecosys tem classes are distinguished in the data set 
\\'hich were aggregated into 12 aggregate land-cover 
categories, as shown in Appendix l . 
The GIS operation onrlaying the results of the 
agroecological assessment with the global ecosystems 
database \\'as tabulated by country to derive the 
distribution of ecosystems within land classes \\'ith 
culti,·a tion potential. Tabulation of land resources, 
both by detailed and aggregate classes, has been 
carried out. For presentation here, the results were 
then further aggregated according to broader geo-
graphic regions. 
(e) Subtraction of land currently under cultivation 
The steps previously described resulted in geo-
graphically explicit accounts of land with cultivation 
potential characterized in terms of major ecosystems 
classes. Finally, to subtract from these the land areas 
curren tly under cultivation two main data sources 
were relied upon: a digital copy of the accounts of 
culti\'ated land compiled by the FAO (F AO 1995 ; 
Appendix 2), and the distribution of farmland eco-
system classes found in the global ecosys tems database. 
It includes ten ecosystem classes of pure or mixed 
agricultural use, which were merged into three 
aggregated land-co,·er categories. We anticipate that 
activities currently underway by the International 
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problem area fiuvisols cultivation 
(PROB) (NFL) potential 
1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha % of total 
1232641 357708 2 759207 100.0 
100462 29334 201217 7.3 
23643 9672 63430 2.3 
1 108537 318 702 2494561 90.4 
262694 90571 862 671 31.3 
845843 228131 1631890 59.l 
71 75 65 
599190 170552 1055956 64.7 
246652 57 579 575933 35.3 
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP) to develop 
high resolution global data sets on land cover and 
elevation (Townshend 1992) will help to improve the 
accuracy of our estimation. 
Regional land balances of areas with cultivation 
potential obtained by applying the five-step procedure 
previously described are presented in Appendix 2, a 
summary for all less developed countries is shown in 
table 6 (for an explanation of table entries refer to table 
6b in Appendix 2). 
5. HOW WELL DO LAND AND WATER 
RESOURCES MATCH THE ANTICIPATED 
REGIONAL POPULATION MOMENTUM? 
As a first check of the extent to which the balance of 
remaining land with culti\·ation potential would enable 
the \'arious regions to cope with the demographic 
trends outlined in§§ l-3 , demand for arable land was 
estimated under crude assumptions for projected 2030 
and 2050 population levels. In the simplest case it is 
assumed that (i) the additional demand for cultivated 
land increases linearly with population; and (ii ) only a 
fraction , overall in the order of 20 % but varying with 
region , of the additional agricultural output needed 
will have to be met from expanding cultivated land. In 
specifying this fraction, we have broadly adopted the 
assumptions of the FAO (FAO 1995) (see table 7). For 
instance, in sub-Saharan Africa about 30 % of the 
contribution to total crop production increases is 
assumed to be derived from expansion of cultivated 
land. For land-scarce Asian regions, this is assumed to 
be only about 5 %. 
T able 8 summarizes the calculations using popu-
lation levels projected for years 2030 and 2050 (UN, 
1997). The share of production increases not accounted 
for by expanding cultivated land would have to come 
from intensification, i.e. higher yields, reduced fallow 
periods and a larger number of crops per year. Table 
8 compares, for groups of countries in less developed 
regions, the additional need for cultivated land 
estimated under these assumptions to the balance of 
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Table 7. Sources of growth in crop production and in harvested area, in developing countries, excluding China ( % ) : source: FA 0 
(1995) 
crop production harvested land 
1970-90 1988/90-2010 1988/90-2010 
contribution of increases in: contribution of increases in: contribution of increases in: 
yields harvested land yields harvested land arable land cropping intensity 
developing countries 69 31 66 34 62 38 
Africa (sub-Saharan) 53 47 53 47 64 36 
t\ear East/Korth Africa 73 27 71 29 31 69 
East Asia 59 41 61 39 82 18 
South Asia 82 18 82 18 22 78 
Latin America and Caribbean 52 48 53 47 60 40 
Table 8. A simple balance of cultivated land in 2050 (1000 ha ) : authors' calculation based on FAO (1995) 
~, ~ of additional 
cultivated share in balance production culti,·ated land 
land total forest and excluding forest increase from required in 
region in 1990 balance wetlands and wetlands land 2050 
Central America and Caribbean 36920 51966 0.80 
South America 152965 il0775 0.69 
Latin America 189885 762 740 0.70 
Eastern Africa 62860 185435 0.70 
'.!iddle Africa 43137 338398 0.75 
:'\orthern Africa 40409 67093 0.26 
Sou them Africa 15849 28062 0.23 
\\"estern Africa 90328 103057 0.36 
Africa 252 583 7220+6 0.61 
\\'es tern Asia 36831 8674 0.92 
South-Eastern Asia 82404 63610 0.89 
South-Central Asia 205614 11443 0.54 
Eastern .-\sia 131376 43588 0.50 
.-\sia 456225 127316 0.73 
de,·eloping countries 899795 1612101 0.66 
land potentially available. Even under these wry mild 
conditions the populous region of South-Central Asia 
and the land-scarce Weste rn Asia region are not likely 
to have enough suitable land resources to meet even 
only 5-10 % of the required production increases from 
expansion of cultivated land, Western Africa reaching 
close to the limits . 
Land cO\·er change, in particular deforestation, has 
been identified as a key factor contributing to global 
environmental change (Turner et al. 1993). Alterations 
of the carbon pools, changes in albedo and the balance 
of sensible and latent heat fluxes , the impacts on total 
runoff and runoff speed, and the concern about loss of 
ecological complexity and biodiversity have prompted 
the international research community to focus their 
attention on the impacts of land use and land cover 
change (Turner et al. 1995; Fischer et al. 1996). It is 
therefore of interest to assess the balance of land 
remaining when setting aside land with crop pro-
duction potential which is currently covered by 
ecologically highly valued ecosystems such as forest or 
wetland ecosystems. If this condition were to be strictly 
applied, six out of eleven developing regions would not 
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10289 20 14603 
221 762 30 82107 
232051 28 96710 
58558 30 68015 
86292 30 52478 
49380 15 13513 
21636 30 12031 
65854 30 95666 
279 719 29 2+1 703 
668 10 9991 
7061 25 37837 
5218 5 20939 
21 794 5 8636 
34 741 10 85 782 
546511 21 424194 
be able to meet the stipulated increases in cultivated 
land, as forests and wetlands co,·er, on average, about 
two-thirds of the balance of land with cultivation 
potential. 
A detailed discussion of the availability of water 
resources and future water use is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Previous studies have been devoted to the 
subject of water resources such as those of Baumgartner 
& Reichel (1975), L'vovich (1979), Shiklomanov & 
~1arkova (1987), Falkenmark (1989), and 
Shiklomanov (1990). A comprehensive analysis and 
collection of data are contained in Gleick ( 1993). 
Kulshreshtha ( 1993) considers several scenarios of 
future water demand and supply at the national level. 
As a crude measure of regional vulnerability with 
respect to water resources, we look at the regional 
levels of annual renewable freshwater water resources 
available per capita, and their change with respect to 
altered population levels. Countries are grouped into 
three broad categories with regard to the availability of 
water resources. \Vater experts suggest that regions 
with an annual renewable freshwater water resource of 
less than 1000 m3 cap-1 yr- 1 should be regarded as 
Table 9. Annual renewable water resources 
(m3 person- 1 yr- 1 ) 
region 1995 2030 2050 
USA and Canada 18141 14386 14012 
Eastern Europe 2403 2586 2749 
!\'onhern Europe 10858 10619 10771 
Southern Europe 3580 3823 4287 
\\'estern Europe 2178 2170 2355 
Russian Federation 28769 33400 37 361 
Japan 4374 4611 4993 
Austra lia and !\'ew Zealand 31269 22826 21926 
Caribbean 2806 1989 1779 
Central America 7919 4908 4243 
Sou th America 30019 20267 18199 
Eastern Africa 2351 982 745 
~diddle Africa 23563 9371 6885 
:\orthern .-\rrica 546 318 272 
Southern Africa 1304 702 578 
\\'estern Africa 4966 2121 1628 
\\'estern Asia 1850 940 769 
South-Eastern Asia 10883 7256 6460 
South-Central Asia 3032 1879 1641 
Eastern Asia 2282 1854 1834 
Central . .\sia 4881 3353 2966 
\\'ater-scarce. \\'hen water supply ranges between 1000 
and 2000 m3 cap- 1 ~-r- 1 \\'ater st ress is likely to occur. 
Only at le\'cls exceeding 2000 m3 cap- 1 yr- 1 are regions 
considered to ha,·e abundant water supplies. Data 
reported by the \\'orld Resources Institute (\\'RI 
1996) and population leHls projected b\' the UN (Ui\' 
1997) were used to flag regions where population 
pressure may result in water st ress as defined abo\'e. 
Table 9 shO\\'S the results of such classification for both 
de\'eloped a nd deHloping regions. In 1995, three of 
the less de,·eloped regions, namely 1\orthern Africa, 
Southern Africa , and \\'estern Asia are considered to 
experience \\'ater scarcity or stress . By 2030, this 
number increases to six, adding Eastern Africa , South-
Central Asia and Eastern Asia. \\'es tern Africa would 
join the ranks of \\'ater-stressed regions between 2030 
and 2050. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we ha,·e re,·iewed what is known and 
expected about future population development. Re-
gional differences in demographic change were 
presented, and population increase was compared with 
estimates of the availability of land and water 
resources. From this analysis some key conclusions can 
be drawn. (i) The 1996 UN population estimates and 
projections indicate a 65 % increase in the world's 
population between 1995 and 2050. (ii ) Population 
numbers in developed regions will, on aggregate, 
remain approximately at the current level. All the 
growth will occur in less developed countries, where 
numbers will increase by more than 80 %. (iii ) There 
is a wide variation of projec ted population increases 
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among less developed regions. The largest increases, in 
percentage terms, between 1995 and 2050 are projected 
for sub-Saharan Africa, namely in Middle Africa 
(240 %), Eastern Africa (215 %) and Western Africa 
(205 %). These are followed by Western Asia (130 %) 
and Southern Africa (125 %). In absolute terms, how-
ever, the largest increase will occur in South-Central 
Asia: an addition of some I.IS billion people during 
the projected 55 years. (iv) Most of the population 
growth will already have occurred by 2030. While 
there are many uncertainties involved when projecting 
demographic changes to 2050 and beyond, the projec-
tion methods are fairly robust and show little varia-
tion when applied to the next 2-3 decades. (v) An 
assessment of the extent ofland with rainfed cultivation 
potential has concluded that land resources in less 
de\'eloped regions could allow crop production on 
some 2.5 billion ha. An estimated 900 million ha were 
under cultivation around 1990, leaving a balance of 1.6 
billion ha. Some 30 % of these extents are adjudged to 
be only marginally suitability due to severe soil and 
landform limitations, excessi,·e wetness conditions or 
drought hazard. (,·i ) The distribution of land resources 
is rather uneven. Of the 1.6 billion ha of the balance of 
land with potential for rainfed crop production, almost 
half (47 %) is located in Latin America, some 45 % in 
Africa, and only 8 % in Asia. (vii ) Overall, it is 
estimated that two-thirds of the balance of land with 
rainfed cultivation potential is currently covered by 
\'arious forest ecosystems, wetlands and mangroves. 
The respec ti\'e percentages by region vary bet\\'een 
23 % in Southern Africa co 89 % in South-Eastern 
Asia. For Latin America and Asia the estimated share 
of the balance of land with cultivation potential under 
forest and wetland ecosystems is about 70 %, in Africa 
it is about 60 °~. If these were to be preser\'ed, the 
remaining balance of land with some potential for 
rainfed crop culti\'ation \\'Ould amount to 550 million 
ha. (viii ) In addition to the uneven spread of land and 
water resources time is an important factor as well. The 
rapid population growth during the next three decades 
will leave little time co de\'elop land and water 
resources along a sustainable path. (ix) The regions 
which will experience the largest difficulties in meeting 
future demand for land resources and water, or 
alternatively have to cope with much increased 
dependency on external supplies, can clearly be 
identified from our analysis. Foremost among these are 
Western Asia, South-Central Asia, and Northern 
Africa. A large stress on resources is to be expected also 
in many countries of Eastern, \\'estern and Southern 
Africa. 
Recent initiatives to establish global monitoring and 
observation systems as well as national and inter-
national programmes to study the driving forces and 
impacts of land use and land cover changes will result 
in much imprO\·ed information that will allow us to 
assess the conditions and prospects for expanding food 
production more precisely than was possible here. Our 
analysis demonstrates that such understanding is of 
utmost importance and urgency. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Global ecosystems database (dataset WEl.4D) 
The first column indicates the global ecosystems class (Kineman & Ohrenschall 1992), the second column the 
aggregation index used in this study. Class levels not listed are not used in the classification. 
NR IA name explanation 
0 II WAT \vaters , including ocean and inland waters 
I 10 CCX city complexes 
2 2 SSC short or sparse grass/shrub of semiarid climates 
6 4 TBE temperate/tropical montane broadleaf evergreen forest 
8 I m.IB desert, mostly bare stone, clay or sand 
16 3 BES broadleaf evergreen scrub (commonly with *46 and *47) 
17 II ICE antarctic ice, land or g rounded shore ice 
20 4 SRC snowy, rainy coastal conifer 
21 4 ~!BC main boreal conifers 
22 4 S:\B snowy non-boreal conifer forest 
23 4 CDF conifer/ deciduous, SOO\\.' persisting in winter 
24 4 TBC temperate broadleaf/conifer forest: with deciduous and/or C\·ergreen hardwood trees 
25 4 SDF ternperate-decidiuous forest, sno\'' persisting in winter 
26 4 TBF temperate broad leaf forest: deciduous, semideciduous 
27 4 !\SC non-snowy conifer forest 
28 4 DIC tropical montane complexes (tree & other) 
29 4 TBS tropical broad leaf seasonal forest, with dry or cool season 
30 15 CFS cool farmland & settlements 
31 15 ~IFS mild/hot farmland & settlements 
32 4 RGD rain-green (drought deciduous) forest 
33 4 TRF tropical rainforest 
36 16 PRA paddy rice and associated lands (part anaerobic ) 
37 16 \\°Cl warm / hot crops with extensi\·e irrigation 
38 16 CCI cool crops with irrigation (variable extent ) 
39 16 CCP cold crops, past ure , irrigation 
+o 2 CGS cool (snowv) grass/shrub (including much 2) 
41 2 ~!GS mild/warm / hot grass/shrub 
42 2 CS~! cold steppe/meadow + / - larch, scrub 
43 2 SG\\' sa\·anna/grass, se-asona l woncls; sa\·anna hPlts 
44 8 ~!BF mire, -cold peatland: sphagnum, grass-like and/or dwarf shrub 
45 8 ~!OS marsh or other swamp (warm- hot) saltv/freshwater marsh, thicket 
46 3 I\IES mediterranean C\·ergreen tree/scrub (winter rainfall ) 
47 3 OHS dry or highland sc rub/ tree (j uniper, etc. ) 
+8 4 DE\\' dry C\·ergreen woodland or low forest (mainly Australia , S. America ) 
49 13 H\'l hot- mild rnlcanic ' islands' (variable ,·eg. ) 
50 I SBD sand desert , partly blowing 
51 I sos semidesert/desert scrub/succulent/sparse grass 
52 css cool/ cold shrub se midese rt /s teppe (sagebrush ... ) 
53 12 TUC\ tundra (polar, alpine) 
54 4 TER temperate ewrgreen rainforest (major forest and wood land ) 
55 14 SF\\' snowy field/woods complex 
56 14 FFR forest/field complex with regrowth after disturbances 
57 14 SFF snowy forest/field, commonly openings are pasture and/or mires 
58 14 F\\·c field/woods with grass and/or cropland 
59 3 ST\\' succulent and thorn ,,·oods 
60 12 SOT southern dry taiga (and other aspen/birch, etc. ) 
61 12 LT larch taiga with deciduous conifer 
62 12 N~!T northern or maritime taiga/tundra 
63 12 WT~1 wooded tundra margin (or mt. scrub , meadow) 
64 8 H~!\V heath and moorland , wild or artificial (grazed ) 
65 13 CN\V coastal: N\\' quadrant near most land 
66 13 CNE coastal: NE quadrant near most land 
67 13 CSE coastal: SE quadrant near most land 
68 II CS\V coastal: SW quadrant near most land 
69 II POL polar desert with rock lichens 
70 II GLA glaciers (other polar and alpine) 
71 I SSF salt /soda flats (playas, lake flats rarely wet) 
72 9 MSi\! mangrove swamp/mudflat (Africa only) 
73 13 ISL islands and shore waters in oceans and/or lakes 
74 13 WAT water (water/land complex) 
75 II Ul\D not defined 
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Appendix 1 (cont. ) 
# aggregate ecosystems classes 
I 
2 
3 
4 
8 
9 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
DESERT 
GRASS 
SHR/FO 
FOREST 
SWAMP 
~!ANGR 
\\'AT/ GL 
T'.\D/TG 
CO AS TL 
FR~l/FO 
FR~l-D 
FR~l-IR 
Cold and hot dese rts, bare land, salt flats, etc. 
Various types of grass and sh rub land 
\' arious tYpes of scrubs and woodland 
Various types of evergreen and deciduous forests 
.l\.lires, marshes, swamps, heath and moorland 
.l\.langro\·e swamps 
\Vater, glaciers, antarctic ice, polar deserts 
Various tundra and taiga areas 
Coastal areas 
Various farm/forest classes 
Dryland farming areas 
Irrigated farmland areas 
APPENDIX 2 
Balance of land with cultivation potential 
Explanations to table 6 and table 6b . For estimating 
the balance of remaining land with crop produc tion 
potential we started by assessing the extents of land 
where climate, soi ls and landform were sufficiently 
suitable for culti,·ation of at least one major crop 
(labelled 'g ross' ) , subtracting from these land units 
a reas under legal protection (shmrn as 'protected' ). 
Land required for habitation and infrastructure is 
estimated using 1990 population levels (shmrn as 
' habit 90 '), and b,· subt racting we form the net 
amount of la nd with cu lti,·ation po tclllial (shown as 
'net' ). From this we subtract land known to be used for 
agriculture (shown as ' culti,·ated ' ).The data are from 
FAOSTAT (F.-\0 1996) and the F.-\O's AT2010 
(FAO 1995) stuch·; data for China haH been compiled 
by the 11.-\S.-\ Land Use Change Project. This allows 
us to form the balance of land with rainfed crop 
production potelllial which is not yet under such use 
(shown as' balance') . The next task was to identify the 
amounts of forest and wetland ecosystems (i.e. ag-
gregate ecosystems classes 4, 8 and 9) within this 
balance. To achieve this, the result from o\·erlaying the 
global ecosystems database (Kineman & Ohrenschall 
1992) onto the land resources inventory was applied. 
The meaning of the respecti\·e rows in tables 6 and 6b 
is as follows: (i) ~0 forest and wetland: percentage of 
forest and wetland ecosystems classes in respective land 
class; (ii ) forest and wetland: extent of forest and 
" ·etland in the balance of each land class; (iii ) other: 
extelll of other ecosystems classes in the balance of each 
land class. 
For instance, in South America some 714097 
thousand ha of land with culti,·ation potential are 
assessed as being still available out of a total of963 525 
thousand ha , i.e. 74. l 010 of the total land with 
culti\·ation potential is currently not used for crop 
culti\·ation. :\ lore than two-thirds of this, 68.8 %, are 
classified as forest or wetland in the global ecosystems 
database. 
Table 6b. Estimated balance of land with rainfed cultivation potential in 1000 ha . 
gle,·sols 
lo\\' rainfa ll uncertai n good rainfall problem and total rainfed 
area rainfall area area area flu,·isols culti\·ation 
(LO\\' ) (C:\C) (GOOD) (PROB) (!\FL) potential 
!000 ha 1000 ha !000 ha !000 ha !000 ha !000 ha 
Cen tral America and 
Caribbean 
gross 1819 2070-t 32472 30645 8691 94331 
protected 3 485 1096 2582 1043 5208 
habit. 90 33 469 830 587 153 2073 
net l 783 19750 30546 27+77 7494 87050 
culti,·ated l l 71 7+73 13940 10630 835 34049 
balance 612 12277 16606 168-!7 6659 53001 
0 
0 forest and wetland 43 7l 82 83 79 80 
forest and wetland 268 8576 13889 14667 5107 42506 
other 3H 3701 2717 2180 1553 10494 
South America 
gross 14096 38835 150551 633066 126979 963525 
protected 481 1536 9Hl 68295 12495 92048 
habit. 90 222 596 1488 3604 745 6655 
net 13393 36702 139821 561167 l 13 739 864822 
[conlinud t11"lfltaf 
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Table 6b (cont. ) 
gleysols 
low rainfall uncertain good rainfall problem and total rainfed 
area rainfall area area area ftuvisols cultivation 
(LOW) (UNC) (GOOD) (PROB) (NFL) potential 
1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha 1000 ha 
culti\·ated 5409 15450 67234 53 726 8906 150725 
balance 7984 21252 72587 507441 104833 714097 
~,~ forest and wetland 29 34 50 72 76 69 
forest and wetland 2276 7222 . 36197 366028 79279 491002 
other 5708 14031 36391 141412 25554 223095 
Eastern Africa 
gross 26078 70571 115022 54832 30540 297042 
protected 4027 9680 14980 5862 6607 41155 
habit. 90 403 1164 1973 1068 473 5081 
net 21647 59727 98069 47903 23460 250807 
culti\·ated 8394 15323 25852 10687 2579 62835 
balance 13253 44404 72217 37216 20881 187972 
~· ~ forest and \vetland 44 75 72 71 61 70 
forest and wetland 5778 33473 52121 26583 12778 130734 
other 7475 10931 20096 10632 8103 57238 
~liddle Africa 
gross 7611 27 700 105295 205 781 63 727 410113 
protected 410 1029 6053 10031 5635 23157 
habit. 90 42 190 821 2027 537 3616 
net 7160 26481 98421 193 722 57556 383340 
cultivated 1423 5711 13204 21893 906 43137 
balance 5737 20770 85217 171829 56650 340203 
~ -0 forest and wetland 14 19 62 84 92 75 
forest and wetland 817 3886 53259 143658 51952 253572 
other 4919 16885 31958 28172 4698 86632 
:\orthern Africa 
gross 20927 35583 24375 9865 16641 107390 
protected 61 525 515 310 382 1793 
habit. 90 279 436 477 132 206 1530 
net 20587 34622 23382 9423 16053 104067 
culti\·ated 14695 8397 8285 2215 2619 36211 
balance 5892 26225 15097 7208 13434 67856 
0 
0 forest and wetland 28 12 40 41 30 26 
forest and wetland 1677 3232 6067 2945 3979 17900 
other 4215 22992 9030 4263 9456 49956 
Southern Africa 
gross 14173 11653 8118 9509 1774 45227 
protected 878 36 0 6 236 1157 
habit. 90 54 9 18 20 4 105 
net 13241 11607 8100 9483 1534 43965 
cultivated 2608 6036 4222 2964 20 15850 
balance 10633 5571 3878 6519 1514 28115 
~~ forest and wetland 33 8 27 9 53 23 
forest and wetland 3502 452 1055 613 808 6430 
other 7131 5119 2823 5906 706 21685 
\\"estern Africa 
gross 32118 50921 59786 56630 12358 211812 
protected* 1072 3084 3631 2641 394 10821 
habit. 90 524 1168 1375 1632 384 5084 
net 30523 46669 54780 52357 11580 195908 
cultivated 20837 19790 20021 25169 4495 90312 
balance 9686 26879 34759 27188 7085 105596 
0;~ forest and wetland 12 31 23 63 51 36 
forest and wetland 1164 8329 7869 17143 3581 38086 
other 8521 18549 26890 10045 3504 67509 
\Vestern Asia 
gross 12245 12740 7411 6255 4920 43571 
protected* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
habit. 90 310 375 282 185 134 1285 
* No data were available in this study. 
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Table 6b (cont. ) 
net 
culti,·ated 
balance 
~ 0 forest and wetland 
forest and wetland 
other 
South-Central Asia 
gross 
protected 
habit. 90 
net 
culti,·ated 
balance 
0 
0 forest and wetland 
forest and \\·etland 
other 
Eastern Asia 
gross 
protected * 
habit. 90 
net 
culti,·ated 
balance 
South-East Asia 
gross 
pro tected 
habit. 90 
net 
culti,·aced 
balance 
0 
0 forest and \\·etland 
forest and \,·etland 
other 
low rainfall 
area 
(LO\\') 
1000 ha 
11935 
8425 
3510 
100 
3510 
0 
31 756 
594 
2138 
29023 
24569 
4+54 
31 
1401 
3053 
11 
0 
0 
11 
3 
8 
1165 
0 
3+ 
1131 
31 
1100 
100 
1100 
0 
* :\o data were a\·ailable in this study. 
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Discussion 
A. YouNG (University of East Anglia, UK ). Several studies, 
including this one, ha\·e arrived at large ' land balances' of 
remaining areas being cultivable but not presently cultivated. 
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Such findings seem to substantially overestimate available 
land , perhaps due to lack of reliable data on current land use. 
An alternative approach should be made, that of posith·ely 
identifying the remaining areas of cultivable land, \'isiting 
sample areas to find its true extent, and giving particular 
attention to ascertain whether such land was already serving 
important purposes. 
G. FISCHER. The work reported in this paper is based on the 
agroecological zone (AEZ) assessment methods developed by 
the FAO and IIASA using updated and enhanced data sets 
and calculation procedures. The analysis distinguishes a very 
large number of geographically explicit map units processed 
in a geographic information system. It therefore allows for 
the location ofland adjudged to have cultivation potential to 
be identified, as suggested in your discussion point. 
\\'e concur with you r concerns regarding data quality. As 
we point out in the paper, there are major international 
efforts underwav to improve the detail and reliability of 
regional and global data sets. ;-..;ew databases derived from 
satellite information are in the process of being released that 
will help to better iden tify the current land cover (and 
perhaps land use) of areas assessed as having cultivation 
potential. Howe\·er, e\·en with the data available to us a t the 
time of the analysis we concluded that more than 60~ 0 of the 
land \\'ith culti,·ation potential appears to be co\·ered by 
forest or wetland ecosystems. 
Another aspect of your discussion point regards the 
difficulty of accounting for land cu rrently under cultirntion, 
which appears to be somet imes underestimated in official 
statistics. For some regions, for instance China, it was possible 
to use estimates of present culti\·ated land that deviate from 
officially published stat istics but represent the best arnilable 
knowledge. Also, it can be obsen·ed that the extents of 
culti\·ated land estimated in the FAO study Tl'orld agriculture: 
tuu•ard::. 20 l 0 in :se\"era l cases su Ustantially exceed the official 
estimates. This ,,·as taken into account in our analysis. 
P. \ 'LEK (C11il'trsity of Gifllingen, Germany ). Can food deficits 
affect \\'orld population growth> Do the current u:\ 
population projections take into account negati,·e feedbacks 
from possible shortages of food? 
G. HEILIG. Can food deficits affect world population 
growth? ,,.e know that recurrent famines ha\·e again and 
again decimated populations in ,·arious places. The Irish 
Famine, two Global Economic Crises, two \\'orld Wars (with 
millions of casualties and much suffering from food deficits ), 
the Great Leap Forward in China (a euphemism that 
covered up the most massive famine in recorded history), th e 
Bengali Famine and numerous African famines (such as in 
Ethiopia and Somalia ) ha\·e all caused the death of many 
millions. These tragic losses have left deep marks in the age 
structures of certain populations-some of them still visible 
today, but they have not affected the global population 
increase. 
On a local or regional level, food deficits can certainly slow 
down population growth, or even lead to population decline. 
It is also likel y that food deficits have at least contributed to 
the eradication of whole civilizations. Some researchers, for 
instance, believe that the l\layas suffered from chronic food 
shortages and recurrent famines after they settled in the 
karstic lowland of Guatemala, which is not \·ery suitable for 
agriculture. 
On the global level, however, it is quite unlikely that food 
deficits have ever or will in the foreseeable future affect 
population growth for the following reasons. ( I ) The world 
food system is not anyw here near the limits of food production 
capacity. There are, of course, all kinds of food limitations 
and agricultural constraints-particularly the inability of 
ga\·ernments in Africa to modernize the agricultural sector 
and infrastructure, or the failure of poverty elimination in 
parts of Latin America or India. Some countries and regions 
also ha\·e serious environmental constraints, such as the lack 
of soils and water in the desert states of Western Asia. But 
there is no immediate limitation of land , water or energy (for 
fertilizers ) 011 the globe. The argument that local deficiencies of 
natural resou rces for food production are the cause of food 
(and popula tion ) crises is a concept of the nineteenth 
century. It not only underestimates the role of modern 
technology in agriculture, but also ignores the fun ctions of 
international trade and economic globalization. Numerous 
densely populated countries have discovered that they can 
simply buy food on international markets if they have income 
from other sources-such as oil exploration, electronic 
industries, tourism, etc. (2) Even if some countries or even 
larger regions, for whate\·er reason, are unable to sus tain 
their population, others \\·ill no t auwma tically stop growing; 
at least not because of their neighbours ' food deficits. There 
are many places in the world th a t could feed much larger 
populations than currently li,·e there. South America , for 
instance, has vast land and water reso urces that could sustain 
a population many times larger. Russia and Canada are, 
compared lO Euro pe, China o r India , almost 'empty ' 
countries full of resources. \\"ere they properlv managed, the 
large arable lands of the Ukraine could feed man y more 
people (before the Second \\"a rid \\"ar the Ukraine was a 
major food exporter to \\"estern Europe ). Parts of Africa a re 
,·ery thinly populated , despite huge resources of arable land , 
sufficient water, and adequate climate conditions. 
..-\.\·ail able stat istics do not ind ica te any signs or a looming 
global food crisis big enough to a ffec t world population 
grow th. Toda ,·, a,·erage per capita food ca lorie supply is 
significantly higher than e\·en 30 vears ago (and certainh· 
since the tim e o f Robert ~Ialthus ) ; \\ 'C eat more \·itamins and 
better and more protein. Of course, th ere is still much hunger 
and under·nutrition in our world. But it is o\·erwhelmingly 
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not caused by natural limitations of food production, but by 
economic, social and political deficiencies in certain 
countries. 
Do th e current UN population projections take into 
account negative feed-backs from possible food supply 
shortages' !\o. The most recent UN population projections 
do not take into account possible food deficits in certain 
countries. 
B. Tr"KER (Unimsity of Oxford, UK ). \Viii there be enough 
time for the development of land resources and the necessary 
improvements in cultivars and agricultural practices, es· 
pecially if there is global change? 
G. FrsCHER. The analysis in our paper was mainly concerned 
with the a\·a ilability of land and water resources relative to 
the expected population increases estimated in the most 
recent C~ population projec tions. Our assessment has shown 
that some of the less d eveloped regions will find it very 
difficult to loca te and de\·elop enough land reso urces for 
agriculture to cater for increased food production to match 
the expected population de\·elopment. In view of the strong 
population momentum, the nex t 20- 30 years ap pear to be 
most critical for achie\·ing food sec urity. It is our under· 
standing tha t closing the wide gap between actual and 
agronomica ll y attainable yields, especially in African 
countries, would bring about major impro\·ements in 
agriculture. In many Asian countries, for instance China and 
India, where yield increases ha ve already been realized in the 
past and additi onal culti,·able land is at a premium, the 
breeding of impro,·ed cultivars and further gains in agro-
nomic treat ments will be crucial to sa feguarding future food 
supplies. This will not happen by itself but requires sustained 
efforts in R & D and agricultural extension se rcices. Global 
change impacts on agriculture, although still uncertain and 
difficult to es timate, are likely to put additional strain on 
agricultural producers, especially those of less developed 
countries in tropica l and sub·tropica l regions. 
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